Don’t Get Bitten By a Radioactive Snake

Now that the cold war is over—the dragon is slain—there are new, smaller yet sinister threats to deal with—poisonous snakes. One of these snakes is nuclear proliferation. During the Cold War, things were both very insecure and very secure at the same time. Things were insecure because at any minute the United States and the USSR might get into a tiff that would turn into a nuclear war and might end the world. So that was bad. At the same time, though, things were pretty clear-cut. There were three sets of nations: ones on the US’s side, ones on the Soviets’ side, and non-aligned ones. As far as the US was concerned, the non-aligned ones were as bad as the ones that sided with the Soviets. The ‘if you’re not with us you’re against us’ mentality among American leaders is not new. Everyone pretty much knew who their enemies were, and there was a very specific agenda behind pretty much every foreign policy decision, and the nuclear weapons were controlled by a very particular community of nations.

Since the collapse of that world order there has been a lot more ambiguity. No nation can simply be classified as either an enemy or a friend based on the Right-ness of their governments. From the collapse of the Berlin Wall to 9/11 there was no real cohesive direction undermining all foreign policy decisions. Trying to further the economic interests of the United States was not the same driving force that the War on Communism had been. Then the War on Terror entered the picture. I would argue that though it has created a collective point for all parts of the government to focus their energy on, the world community is less clean-cut than ever.

It is not clear which nations are enemies and which are friends in the context of the War on Terror. No nation would proudly announce itself to be a state sponsor of terror, and it is a difficult charge to prove. It somewhat clearer when it comes to nuclear proliferation. With the collapse of the Soviet Union there were suddenly former Soviet republics that had nuclear weapons. They are probably less secure than they were during the Cold War period. There are also nations attempting to create weapons programs of their own. At least this is a clearer point: either a nation has nuclear weapons, is attempting to get them, or doesn’t have them. It is a little harder to hide the development of nuclear weapons than clandestine support to a non-state actor. Non-state actors are what makes the new world order especially murky. They are difficult to fight, locate, and almost impossible to control. If one of the nations that has nuclear weapons cannot secure them or is willing to sell them, the world faces the possibility of a non-state actor with a nuclear weapon. I hope that doesn’t happen. I also hope that North Korea doesn’t have or get nukes capable of reaching Seattle, because I’m from there.

The Space Race: Anything You Can Do I Can Do Better

It was all about appearing to be ahead during the Cold War. Rhetoric regarding research was really as relevant as the research itself. Kennedy’s speech, “The Space Challenge” is a perfect example. He condenses human history down into 50 years from 50,000. Then most of man’s technological developments have occurred sometime this year. He says, “And now if America's new spacecraft succeeds in reaching Venus, we will have literally reached the stars before midnight tonight.” That was a brilliant speech. America is going to actually reach the stars. And soon. That’s a pretty impressive state of affairs. In a battle of ideologies, it’s about being perceived to be better. For Kennedy’s statement to have anything beyond the ability to stir American imaginations momentarily, there must be science to back it up. Rhetoric and results is a tough combo to beat.

The fact that the Soviets beat the US to space had to be dealt with politically and scientifically. In the same speech Kennedy said, “To be sure -- to be sure, we are behind and will be behind for some time in manned flights but we do not intend to stay behind and in this decade we shall make up and move ahead.” He concedes that we are behind and without missing a beat suggests that it is nothing to worry about, we will Pass them up momentarily. In fact, we really seem more behind than we are because they do not admit their faults like we do: “We have had our failures, but so have others, even if they do not admit them and they may be less public.” If you only knew how many mistakes the Soviets are making, he implied, you would know we are not as far behind as you think. This was all followed up, of course, by putting pressure on the scientific community to run great space programs. And they came through. The US created a great space program. Though we seemed to be behind, the Americans were actually producing better programs. Much of the Soviet space program was just a façade. Their space program served political needs than scientific ones.

The militarization of space was an important consideration as we raced to the final frontier. In the speech Kennedy gave in 1962, he said “We have vowed that we shall not see space filled with weapons of mass destruction, but with instruments of knowledge and understanding.” Despite this statement, that same year he sought to increase the Department of Defense’s budget to $850 million for space programs (“Hooded Falcons” 335). I doubt anyone was shocked at that. Politics is full of lying politicians, and the Cold War was full of attempts to make military programs appear peaceful. The arms race was really about keeping peace, MAD demands it, and MAD keeps us at peace. Nuclear research was aimed at creating functional applications to create a more perfect world, not to explore any more sinister applications. And now, the space race is about furthering man’s understanding of the universe, nothing more.

It’s a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad World

Of the strategies put forth on how to achieve world peace, one is inclined to assume that the “build more weapons” one is likely to be a loser. It’s almost like saying, how do we prevent more school shootings? Let’s arm all the kids, and then no one is likely to shoot anyone because the other kids would retaliate and shoot him. A logical kid wouldn’t shoot anyone in those conditions. This doesn’t account for the crazy people factor, or the ‘accidentally shooting someone in the face’ factor. The same risks apply in the global realm. Despite the ridiculous dangers it presented, MAD was a central tenet of the Cold War.

If you nuke me, and kill tons of my people, I’m going to nuke you back, at least as much, but probably more because you really upset me by bombing me. The fact that you struck first means no holds barred, I think that any level of retaliation is acceptable. I wasn’t going to fight you, but since you started it, I feel no remorse. Bring it. Unfortunately for me, you have more than just that one bomb; you’re prepared to match me bomb for bomb. So we’d end up utterly destroying each other. Of course, if I’m silly and strike you first, you’re going to have the same mentality. So let’s not and say we did?

That’s MAD if it was a conversation between two twenty-year old girls. Lucky for us we have eloquent spokesmen to euphemize the above conversation. Kennedy probably didn’t say “bring it” during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Real world MAD has the same problems as the madness that arming all schoolchildren does. MAD rests on the presumption that both parties will act rationally: it would be a really bad idea for me to nuke you, because you’d nuke me back and we’d both die. If one of the parties is irrational and decides to bomb the enemy anyway, the world could conceivably end—so let’s just fight proxy wars in Africa and Southeast Asia. When a kid has a gun, you’re afraid not only that he might get angry and shoot someone, but that he might accidentally shoot someone because he doesn’t know what he’s doing. Well, if one of the superpowers during the Cold War had had an accident, it’s not likely that any of us would be alive. MAD leaves no room for niceties. If the other side bombs you, you must retaliate, because you have to show them what it costs to attack you. If you don’t retaliate in kind, the enemy knows that they can get away with bombing you. MAD requires that both sides fear each other.

MAD shares its principles with the saying “an eye for an eye.” But as Gandhi points out, “an eye for an eye makes the whole world blind.” In the case of the Cold War, though, it was more along the lines of “a nuke for a nuke makes the whole world end.”

Can You Make It Wash My Dishes? No, But It Can Disinfect Your Food.

Do you have a calf that has hyperthyroidism? Well, your solution is clearly atomic energy. Just give him a little radioactive iodine and his thyroid will slow right down. Of course, he will probably die of radiation poisoning. That problem was not understood in the 1950s as atomic energy emerged as a panacea, though. Little was known about the negative consequences that accompany the use of atomic energy, or at least it was presumed that those little kinks would work themselves out.

Atomic energy was going to be able to be brought into every home, not just from far away nuclear power plants, but in at-home generators. We were going to fly in nuclear-powered airplanes* and drive nuclear-powered cars. Those ideas were pretty much taken off the market as realistic possibilities once the realities of possible explosions and fallout became clear. Other possible peaceful applications of nuclear technology included using it as an excavation tool in place of TNT. It requires significantly less nuclear material than TNT to make comparable holes. The drawback to using nuclear technology was, of course, the fact that it left radiation in the soil. The hope was that it would be possible, with continued research, to reduce the radiation to negligible levels. Once the radiation was low enough, nukes would have made great, inexpensive excavation tools.

One of the ideas for a peaceful use of nuclear energy mentioned in the readings was as a food preservative. A loaf of bread could be kept free of mold for months, a six month old potato sprouted like new, and an orange stayed fresh and juicy after it was treated with gamma-radiation. These treated foods were apparently given to rats without any complications, then volunteers tried it, even a few Congressmen dared to take a bite of the irradiated foods. The FDA had not approved the process, despite its living veterans.

All of these ideas are great if you want to sell atomic research to the voting public. Are your energy bills too high? Nuclear power can help you! Is gas too expensive? Nuclear energy can help you! Wouldn’t you like more efficient paths from point A to point B? Nuclear excavation can help you! Do you buy fresh foods that go bad before you use them? Waste no more, nuclear radiation is here to save the day. This sale of nuclear power as a cure-all sets off my cynic alarm. Wouldn’t it be convenient if the public supported further investigation of the capabilities of nuclear power? Marketing can help you! There was a lot of interest in doing further research on nuclear power in the post-war period among world leaders, and a certain level of fear in the population that had just witnessed its awesome destructive power. It follows, then, that the high-ups would want to show people how great nuclear power can really be. Perhaps people will set their fears aside when they see how it can serve their self-interest.

*I noticed that the would-be nuclear plane was developed by Lockeed, and I was wondering if that was a component of Lockeed-Martin, that we hear so much about in the news now. If it is, it would be very interesting to look at the development of that company in the context of the expansion of the military-industrial complex.

Post 6: And You Thought Dropping an F-Bomb Was Impolite...

To create a weapon with massively lethal destructive power beyond the scope of human imagination, or not to create a weapon with massively lethal destructive power beyond the scope of human imagination? That is the question.

There were only two answers to that question about building the H-Bomb: do it or don’t. The “do it” group were cold warriors who supported an ever-increasing military arsenal as the best solution to defeating the Soviets. This required that Americans beat the Soviets to every military technology so America always would have the most powerful weapons available. The “don’t” group saw the weapon as an unnecessary danger. It is possible, they argued, to be fully prepared to win a war against the Soviets without creating such an immensely powerful weapon. It would not be pragmatic to create a weapon that would destroy so much territory and kill so many civilians when a tactical nuclear bomb would cause much less carnage and be able to used on, and limited to, a battlefield.

An outspoken member of the “do it” group was Edward Teller (of the Teller-Ulam design). Attempting to take a moral stance on the H-Bomb was ridiculous, he argued. The A-Bomb and H-Bomb are equally immoral, they are both extremely powerful devices designed to kill, the degree mattered little. Development of an H-Bomb is inevitable, anyway. Teller said, “If the development is possible, it is out of our powers to prevent it. All that we can do is retard its completion by some years…. The terrible consequences of a super bomb will not be avoided by ignoring or postponing the issue but by wise and provident planning” (Cassidy 288). His argument is that once it is possible to develop a weapon like this, someone will. Years later, he never changed his position. He maintains that knowledge in itself is valuable, so the development of the H-Bomb was not a mistake (Cassidy 288).

Oppenheimer was the big name of the “don’t” group. Though Oppenheimer was doing his best to tow the line and stay in the good graces of the government, given the threats of the McCarthy era, he did not support the development of the H-Bomb (Cassidy 285). He and the Scientific Advisory Panel advised against developing the weapon for two reasons. The first was that the creation of this more powerful bomb would escalate the arms race, and the second was the moral issue. Arthur Compton was a member of the panel. When advising the Vice President he said, “…we should prefer defeat in war to a victory obtained at the expense of the enormous human disaster that would be caused by its determined use” (Cassidy 288). Americans really don’t like to lose wars.

Ultimately, Teller and the “do it” group won, and the H-Bomb was developed. Teller was motivated by the pursuit of knowledge for knowledge’s sake (Cassidy 288). Others were seduced by the power of the enormous weapon. It is one thing when the debate is among intellectuals who give the appropriate consideration to using such a weapon. Now, though, it is on youtube for the world’s consumption:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NNcQX033V_M

When I watched this video on Oct 18, there was a comment under it that said:

“there can never be enough of them bombs
we have to protect our country against terrorists, aliens, arabs and greenpeace
so build more of them!”

Teller and others thought that this technology will be able to be kept on a shelf and never used, and so far, they seem to be right. The memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is still fresh and scary enough to have deterred nuclear war. But there are those, like whoever made this comment above, who are not slowed by caution or empathy, and are driven only by hate and ignorance. One can only hope that no one with his mentality ever seizes control of a powerful weapon. But now, thanks to the “do it” group, it is possible that someone might.

Post 5: The Red, Scary Rosenbergs (and Friends)

During the Red Scare, people were very right and very wrong all at once. They were right that there were some Soviet spies in the United States, and they were often recruited from the American Communist Party, as many Americans feared. But somehow McCarthy & co. managed to find everyone that wasn’t a Soviet spy and put them on trial. Only through strokes of luck and/or conscience did Americans actually find any spies.

In the early 20th century, Americans were terrified that Communism would seize control of their country. In reality, though, there was no nation less threatened by a Communist takeover. No Communist politician had a chance to gain any kind of influence, and, Powers explains in Intelligence Wars, “among the Communist parties of the world few were smaller, poorer, or weaker than the CP-USA” (109). So the fear of a Communist America was unfounded.

Though the Communists were unlikely to ever gain significant political control, there were a handful of Soviet spies within our borders. Many of these were uncovered through the Soviet VENONA traffic which the CIA managed to crack because the Soviets did not take the necessary precautions to make their ciphers sound. They were reusing the keys to encrypt their messages, so they were less secure and easier for the Americans to crack. This lucky moment of Soviet laziness came about just as three major Soviet spies defected to the United States: Igor Gouzenko, Elizabeth Bentley, and Whittaker Chambers. Each of these spies indicated others (Powers 111). Really, this was a huge triumph for intelligence, but it actually added fuel to people’s fears. Rather than feeling reassured that the spies were being captured, people were afraid these spies were only the tip of the iceberg. Powers explains that in the 1950s, “when the average American first started to worry about Communists in government, the Soviet spy threat was largely over” (113). Reality, though, rarely seems to affect public opinion.

There were several real breaches of security surrounding nuclear technology. Clarence Hiskey worked on the Manhattan Project in Chicago, where the first reactors were designed, and he was a Soviet agent. Alan Nunn May was a British scientist working on the joint American-British heavy water project in Canada. He actually gave a sample of U-235 to the Soviets. Most famous, though, are the Rosenbergs. David Greenglass was a soldier at Los Alamos that passed information and pictures to his sister Ethel and her husband Julius Rosenberg. The Rosenbergs then turned that information over the Soviets (Powers 65). They were executed for treason. At the time there was an outcry because people thought they were innocent. As further documents have been declassified, it has become clear that they were guilty.

Then there was Oppenheimer. He was approached by his friend Chevalier and asked to provide classified information to the Soviets (Cassidy 280). He claimed he did not give any information, but he did not give a full account of the approach immediately, and that was suspicious. Personally, Oppenheimer had ties to the Communist party all over the place. His brother and wife were former Communists, he had a love affair with a Communist, and had been approached by Communists. He swore up and down that he was not a Communist and did not give any information to the Soviets, and General Groves, the military head of the Manhattan Project, believed him. Others did not believe him. He was stripped of his security clearance, but most historians now agree that it was likely because he was not enthusiastically supportive of the H-Bomb, not because he was a spy (Powers 66).

Post 4: Pakistani Nukes: When Physics and Politics Meet and Say 'Yikes!'

The discussion we had in class on Monday about nuclear proliferation, particularly the mention of India and Pakistan reminded me of an article I noticed in the New York Times on Sunday. Given the chaotic situation in Pakistan right now, there is some concern over the state of the country’s nuclear weapons. The current situation illustrates how unstable politics can cause nuclear physics to be all the more threatening.

Dr. Kahn is a Pakistani nuclear scientist that developed the country’s bomb. In 2004, he confessed to running a secret nuclear proliferation network where he sold nuclear technology to several countries. He was best able to run his service when the government of Pakistan was going through periods of turmoil. Since his confession he has been under house arrest, and there is nothing in the news to indicate a fear that he might escape and reopen his business. He did start a precedent though, which made Pakistan become known as “the hub of the biggest proliferation network in nuclear history” (Sanger n.pag.). The current tumultuous political situation, though, is reminiscent of the conditions under which Kahn’s service flourished. Though it may not be Kahn himself, there may be others who are ready to exploit the situation in a similar way (Sanger).

The current political unrest might disrupt the protections that Musharraf has on the nuclear weapons. He and several top officials that he personally trusts hold the keys to the transportation and deployment of the weapons. The weapons and their detonators are stored separately, and the weapons’ guards are given thorough personal screenings. Many people doubt how secure the weapons are, despite Musharraf’s assurances. In the past he has given overly optimistic reports on the status of security in his country, so it is best to take his casual confidence with a grain of salt.

The dangers now are that a terrorist group could exploit the current chaos to overcome the security measures, or that an fundamentalist Islamic government could come to power (Sanger). The terrorist group might be motivated to use the weapon to make a point, and the fundamentalist governors might being willing to use them and start a nuclear war with India. That would be bad. So the hope lies with the military. The Pakistani military is very professional, according to the New York Times, and the hope is that regardless of the tumult around them, the soldiers will stand strong at their posts and not allow anything unfortunate to happen (Sanger).

Pakistan is a great example of the cross-overs of physics and politics. Kahn, a physicist, was motivated, most likely by greed, to commit the dangerous political act of selling information. He exploited the political situation of the time to do so. Now there is another political situation that might empower someone else to do what Kahn did, or worse, to use a weapon. Political unrest today in a nuclear power means that physics is a threat to the fate of the world.

Sanger, David E. “So, What About Those Nukes?” New York Times. 11 Nov. 2007. NYTimes.com 12 Nov. 2007